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Note
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
MARYLAND'S RESPONSE IN THE
WAKE OF BOULDER
With two decisions, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light
Corp.' and Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,' the
Supreme Court sent shock waves through state and local govern-
ments.' These decisions dispelled the belief 4 that local govern-
ments had the same degree of antitrust5 immunity as state
governments. Suddenly, local governments were subject to the pos-
sibility of lengthy antitrust trials and treble damage awards. This
Note will review the history of the state action doctrine,6 the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court that held this doctrine inapplicable to
local government actions, and Maryland's attempt to protect its lo-
calities from antitrust liability.
I. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine was first articulated in Parker v.
Brown.7 In Parker, a California state statute8 authorized state officials
1. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
3. As used in this paper, the term local government refers to both county and mu-
nicipal governments.
4. This belief probably stemmed from overly broad statements made by the
Supreme ,Court in previous decisions. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351
(1943) ("[The purpose of the Sherman Act] was to suppress combinations to restrain
competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations .... ") (emphasis
added).
5. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade among the several States,
or with foreign nations is hereby declared illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). The term antitrust laws, as used in this paper, refers to the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27
(1982).
6. The state action doctrine provides that the Sherman Act is inapplicable when
states are acting pursuant to their sovereign capacity. Thus, when state regulation sup-
plants the competitive market and regulates it intensively, the antitrust laws do not ap-
ply. Parker, 317 U.S. 341.
7. Id. For further discussion of Parker, see Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26J. LAw AND EcON. 23 (1983); Massella, The Antitrust State Action Exemption,
107 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 50 (January 15, 1981); Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State Action
Doctrine and the Federalism of Antitrust, 51 ANTITRUST LJ. 337 (1982); Slater, Antitrust and
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to establish marketing programs for agricultural commodities pro-
duced in the state.9 The defendants were the California Director of
Agriculture and other public officials required by the statute to ad-
minister a program for the marketing of the 1940 raisin crop. The
express purpose of the program was to restrict competition among
growers and maintain prices in the distribution of raisins to pack-
ers.1 ° The plaintiff, a producer and packer of raisins, alleged that
this program prevented him from freely marketing his crop in inter-
state commerce."
The Court, while noting that a comparable program organized
by private parties would violate the antitrust laws, 12 held that the
defendants had not violated the Sherman Act because the Act was
not intended to restrain a state, its officers or agents from activities
directed by their legislature.'" The Court found nothing in the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act or in its history suggesting that the Act
proscribed anticompetitive state action.' 4 This decision, based on
Government Act: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974); and
Werden & Balmer, Conflicts Between State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1
(1982).
8. Namely, The California Agricultural Prorate Act (the "Act"). Parker, 317 U.S. at
344.
9. Specifically, the statute authorized the creation of a Prorate Advisory Commis-
sion (the "Commission") and a Director of Agriculture (the "Director"). Upon the peti-
tion of ten producers, the Commission would hold a public hearing and make economic
findings showing that the institution of a program was necessary to meet the purposes of
the Act. The Director, with the approval of the Commission, would then select a pro-
gram committee that would formulate a marketing program for the commodity subject
to the Commission's approval. If the program was approved by a public hearing, the last
step in the process would be to hold a referendum on the program. If 65% of the
producers approved of the program it would be put into effect. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-
47.
10. 317 U.S. at 346. The Act stated that it was designed to "ensure the agricultural
wealth of the State" and "to prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural
crops." Id.
11. The program for marketing raisins became effective on September 7, 1940.
Under the program, producers were permitted to sell only 30% of their raisins through
ordinary commercial channels and the remaining product was controlled by the pro-
gram committee. The plaintiff had entered into contracts to sell his raisins before the
adoption of the program. He alleged that the Commission's enforcement of the pro-
gram would prevent him from fulfilling these contracts. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346-47. The
Act provided for both criminal and civil penalties in the event a producer violated the
requirements of the program. Id. at 347.
12. Id. at 350.
13. Id. at 351. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that it is the pro-
ducers, not the State, who petition for the program and that these same producers ap-
prove the program by referendum. Id. at 352.
14. Id. Furthermore, the Court found nothing in either the Sherman Act or its his-
tory suggesting that the Act did not proscribe anticompetitive state conduct; "[t]he Sher-
man Act makes no mention of the state as such ... ." Id. at 351.
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the concept of federalism, emphasized that in a dual system of gov-
ernment such as ours, which recognizes state sovereignty, "an unex-
pressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."' 5
While the Parker decision recognized that the Sherman Act was
inapplicable to state action, the Court did not define what consti-
tutes state action for Sherman Act purposes, nor did it identify
which officials would be considered state actors. These questions
remained unanswered for thirty years until, in a flurry of antitrust
rulings, the Supreme Court defined and narrowed the state action
doctrine.
II. NARROWING THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Beginning in the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court rendered a
series of decisions that narrowed the application of the state action
doctrine. The first of these decisions was Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 6 in which the Court held that a local county bar association's
publication of a minimum fee schedule for lawyers was not exempt
from the Sherman Act, even though the schedule was enforced by
the Virginia State Bar.' 7 The fee schedule at issue was published by
the Fairfax County Bar Association. The County Bar Association
had no enforcement powers; the fee schedule was enforced by the
Virginia State Bar. The Virginia State Bar was the administrative
agency through which the Virginia Supreme Court regulated the
practice of law.'"
The Virginia State Bar, a state agency by law, contended that
issuing fee schedule reports and ethical opinions condoning fee
schedules was its method of implementing the fee provisions of the
ethical codes adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court.' 9 The
County Bar Association, a private entity, argued that the ethical
codes and activities of the Virginia State Bar "prompted" it to issue
15. Id.
16. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a further discussion of the Goldfarb case, see Note, Parker
v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor & Bates, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 898 (1977).
17. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The case arose when the petitioner unsuccessfully
tried to find an attorney who would conduct a title examination for less than the fee
prescribed in the minimum-fee schedule published by the Fairfax County Bar Associa-
tion. Id. at 776. The petitioner brought suit alleging that the minimum fee schedule and
its enforcement mechanism was a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 778.
18. Id. at 776. The County Bar Association was a voluntary organization, while
membership in the State Bar was mandatory in order to practice law in Virginia. Id.
19. Id. at 789-90.
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fee schedules.2" Based upon this assertion, the County Bar Associa-
tion maintained that its actions were state action for Sherman Act
purposes and therefore protected by the state action doctrine.2"
The Court rejected this assertion, holding that anticompetitive ac-
tivity must be "compelled" by the state acting as sovereign in order
for the activity to fall within the state action doctrine.22 The Court
found that Virginia did not require either the State Bar or the
County Bar Association to engage in anticompetitive activities.
There was no Virginia statute regarding fees, and the Virginia
Supreme Court did not direct either of the parties to enact fee
schedules, nor did it approve the State Bar's ethical opinions.25
Since both the State Bar's and the County Bar Association's activi-
ties were only "prompted" by the state, those activities were not
protected by the state action doctrine.
In Goldfarb, the dispositive fact for the Court was that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's ethical code did not direct, nor require, the
State Bar or the County Bar Association to establish or enforce min-
imum fee schedules. 24 The State Bar, according to the Court, was
not shielded from antitrust liability simply because it was a state
agency for some limited purposes. By voluntarily joining in the pri-
vate anticompetitive conduct of the County Bar Association, the
State Bar became subject to the Sherman Antitrust requirements.25
Hence, in the Court's view, the County Bar Association's challenged
activity could not be considered state action.26
Two years later, the Supreme Court was again faced with an
antitrust claim against a state bar in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.2 7 In
Bates, the Court held that the Arizona Bar's disciplinary rules re-
stricting lawyers from advertising did not violate the Sherman Act.2"
The fact that these rules were expressly adopted and enforced by
20. Id. at 790.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 791.
23. Id. at 790-91.
24. Id. at 791.
25. Id. at 791-92 (emphasis added). This action was voluntary because the Virginia
Supreme Court did not require the State Bar to participate in such activities. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
26. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Virginia State Bar
published reports condoning fee schedules and also issued opinions indicating that the
fee schedules could not be ignored. 421 U.S. at 776-77.
27. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). For a further discussion of the Bates decision, see Richards,
Exploring the Far Reaches of the State Action Exemption: Implications for Federalism, 57 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 274 (1983); Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor & Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977).
28. The attorneys conceded (Bates, 433 U.S. at 355) that they had violated Discipli-
1048 [VOL. 45:1045
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the Arizona Supreme Court29 distinguished Bates from Goldfarb. In
Goldfarb, the Virginia Supreme Court did not expressly adopt the
State Bar's minimum fee schedule.3 0 The Bates court found that the
disciplinary rules reflected a clearly and affirmatively expressed state
policy that was actively supervised by the state.3 Thus, the rules
were exempt from any Sherman Act claims.3 2
The Goldfarb and Bates decisions failed to fully clarify the state
action exemption. Within a year the Court addressed the issue once
again. In Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co. ,3' the
Supreme Court upheld the California Automobile Franchise Act
(the Act), which required motor vehicle manufacturers to "secure
the approval of the California New Motor Vehicle Board before
nary Rule 2-101(B), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17A (Supp. 1976) which states:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display adver-
tisements in city or telephone directories or other means of commercial public-
ity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
The appellants placed an advertisement in a daily newspaper of general circulation.
The advertisement stated that the appellants were offering "legal services" at "very rea-
sonable fees" and listed their fees for certain services. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354.
29. Id. at 361.
30. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791. The Court also distinguished Cantor v. Detroit Editor
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor the defendant, an electric utility company, distrib-
uted light bulbs to its residential customers without charge. The cost of this program
was included in its state-regulated utility rates. The plaintiff, a retailer who sold light
bulbs, claimed the utility was using its monopoly power in the distribution of electricity
to restrain competition in the sale of light bulbs. According to the Bates court, the Cantor
opinion held "that the utility could not immunize itself from the Sherman Act by em-
bodying its challenged practices in a tariff approved by a state commission." Bates, 433
U.S. at 360.
The Court found Cantor distinguishable from Bates on three grounds. First, Cantor
was a suit against a private party; the Court stated that it "would have been an entirely
different case if the claim had been directed against a public official or public agency."
433 U.S. at 361. Second, in Cantor the State had no independent regulatory interest in
the market for light bulbs. Bates, on the other hand, involved regulation of bar activities,
which were within the State's police powers. Id. at 361-62. Finally, "the ... program in
Cantor was [begun] by the utility with only the acquiescence of the state regulatory com-
mission." Id. at 362. By contrast, the disciplinary rules at issue in Bates clearly reflected
the State's policy regarding professional behavior. Id.
31. 433 U.S. at 362.
32. Id. at 363. Bates demonstrates the possible dangers arising when a state succeeds
with a "state action" defense in antitrust suits. Once state action is found, the activity in
question becomes subject to the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in Bates, because the
disciplinary rules were state action regulating speech, they were subject to the first
amendment. The Court found that a total ban on attorney advertising violated the first
amendment: the disciplinary rule, therefore, was unconstitutional. Id. at 384.
33. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
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opening a retail motor vehicle dealership within the market area of
an existing franchise if ... that existing franchise protested the es-
tablishment of a competing dealership."34 The Act provided that
the state would hold a hearing if an automobile franchisee protested
the establishment or relocation of the competing dealership.35 The
appellees contended that the state scheme gave effect to privately
initiated restraints on trade, since the Act allowed competing deal-
ers to delay the establishment of new automobile dealerships.36
The appellees perceived the Act as an attempt to immunize private
conduct that violated the antitrust laws. 37 The Court found that the
Act was "a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in the
matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealer-
ships."38 In view of the state's active role, particularly when existing
franchisees invoked their statutory right to protest, the Court held
that the program was not subject to the Sherman Act.39
The state action doctrine was finally crystalized into a two-part
test in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. 4 In that case, the California legislature passed a statute
designed to implement a wine pricing system. The statute required
that all wine producers and wholesalers file fair trade contracts or
price schedules with the state.4' A wholesaler selling below the es-
34. Id. at 98. The Court noted that these regulations were actually passed to pro-
mote competition. The Act was enacted to protect retail dealers from perceived abusive
and oppressive acts by the manufacturers. Id. at 100-01. The Act was designed, inter
alia, to prevent manufacturers from adding dealerships to the market areas of its existing
franchisees in circumstances where "intrabrand competition" effectively would injure
both existing franchisees and the public interest. Id. at 102.
35. Id. at 103.
36. Id. at 109.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court found that the Act did not lose this exemption simply because
existing dealers initially invoked the review of the Board through their protests. Id. at
110. The Court did note, however, that dealers who press sham protests in an effort to
delay the establishment of competing dealerships would be subject to antitrust suits. Id.
at 110 n.15.
39. Id. at 110-11.
40. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). For further discussion regarding the Midcal case, see Burling,
Lee & Quarles, "State Action" Antitrust Immunity - A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 1982
B.Y.U.L. REV. 809; Morgan, Antitrust and State Regulation: Standards of Immunity After Mid-
cal, 35 ARK. L. REV. 453 (1982); Richards, Reconciling the Tension Between Anti-Competitive
State Regulations and the Sherman Act, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 539 (1982); Werden & Balmer,
Conflicts Between State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1982); Note, Limita-
tion on State Action Antitrust Exemption, 6J. CORP. L. 681 (1981).
41. 445 U.S. at 99.
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tablished prices faced fines or license suspension or revocation.4 2
The state had no control over the wine prices and did not review the
reasonableness of these prices."
The Court held that the statutory wine pricing system
amounted to illegal resale price maintenance, thus violating the
Sherman Act.4 4 In reaching this result, the Court stated that a two-
part test must be met to qualify for state action immunity: "First,
the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively
supervised' by the State itself."4 5 The first part of the test was met
since the California legislature expressly stated that its purpose was
to permit resale price maintenance. 6 Yet the pricing scheme itself
failed the supervisory requirement.4 7 Under the pricing system "the
State simply authoriz[ed] price setting and enforc[ed] the prices es-
tablished by private parties."48 The state did not establish prices,
review the reasonableness of the prices, or engage in any "pointed
re-examination" of the program.49 This system left the wine produ-
cers with the power to prevent price competition by determining the
prices to be charged by wholesalers.5 ° The Court determined that
the state's supervisory involvement in the price-setting program was
insufficient to establish state action immunity.5 Thus, the program
was not entitled to state action immunity.5 2 It is against this back-
ground that the Court decided the first antitrust case to involve local
government defendants, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light
Co. 5 3
42. Id. at 100.
43. Id. at 99.
44. Id. at 103. A resale price maintenance agreement is an agreement between a
manufacturer and retailer in which the latter cannot resell the manufacturer's product
below a specified minimum price. See U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960);
U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
45. 445 U.S. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978) (plurality) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
46. 445 U.S. at 105.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 105-06.
50. Id. at 103.
51. Id. at 105-06. The Court distinguished the program issue in Parker, supra notes 7-
15, because of the extensive official oversight inherent in that program. Without such
oversight, the result could have been different. 445 U.S. at 104. The Court noted that
the state action role also distinguished Fox from the problems of the statute at issue in
Midcal. Id. at 105.
52. 445 U.S. at 105.
53. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). For further discussion of the Lafayette decision, see Areeda,
Antitrust Immunity for "State Action "After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981); Bangasser,
1051
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III. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Lafayette involved a group of municipal defendants who were
authorized by state law to own and operate electric utility systems,
both within and beyond their city limits. The municipalities com-
peted in areas beyond their city limits with Louisiana Power and
Light Company (LP&L), a privately owned electric utility.54 The
municipalities filed suit against LP&L, among others, alleging that:
LP&L monopolized the generation, transmission, and distribution
of electric power by preventing the construction and operation of
competing utility systems; by foreclosing supplies from markets
served by defendants; by engaging in boycotts; and by utilizing
sham litigation and other improper means to prevent the financing
of construction projects beneficial to the municipalities.55 LP&L
counterclaimed against the municipalities, seeking damages and in-
junctive relief for alleged antitrust offenses. These alleged offenses
included: conspiring to engage in sham litigation; using covenants
to eliminate competition within the municipal boundaries; using
long-term supply agreements to exclude competition in certain mar-
kets; and displacing LP&L by requiring the utility's customers to
purchase electricity from the municipalities in order to maintain re-
ceipt of water and gas service.56
The municipalities "moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the
ground that, as cities and political subdivisions of the State of Loui-
siana, the 'state action' doctrine ... rendered federal antitrust laws
inapplicable to them."' 57 The Court, in a plurality decision, held
that municipalities, simply by their status as such, are not protected
by the Parker doctrine. 58 A majority of the Court agreed only that
Exposure of Municipal Corporations to Liability for Violations of the Antitrust Laws: Antitrust Im-
munity After the City of Lafayette Decision, 11 URB. LAw. vii (1979); Rose, Municipal Activities
& the Antitrust Laws After City of Lafayette, 57 DET. J. URB. L. 483 (1980); Thomas, City of
Lafayette's State Action Test Reformulated: A Meaningful Standard of Antitrust Immunities for Cit-
ies, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345; Comment, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.: Will
Municipal Antitrust Liability Doom Effective State-Local Government Relations? 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 129 (1979); Note, Antitrust Treble Damages as Applied to Local Government Entities:
Does the Punishment Fit the Defendant? 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411; Note, Municipalities' Increased
Susceptibility to Antitrust Liability: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 24 B.C.L.
REV. 1399 (1983).
54. 435 U.S. at 391-92.
55. Id. at 392 n.5.
56. Id. at 392 n.6.
57. Id. at 392.
58. Id. at 408-11 (Brennan,J., Marshall,J., Powell,J., and Stevens,J., plurality). The
result in Lafayette appears to contradict the decision in Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968). In Avery, the Supreme Court held that the actions of local governments
are actions of the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The Court did not
1052 [VOL. 45:1045
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Congress did not intend to exempt local governments per se from
antitrust laws. 59
The plurality in Lafayette gave two reasons why local govern-
ments should not be granted the same state action immunity en-
joyed by state governments. First, municipal decisions might
express only "purely parochial interests" rather than state policy.6"
Second, cities might disregard possible adverse impacts on consum-
ers beyond municipal boundaries, who lack direct recourse through
the political process.6' The Court found that Parker "exempts only
anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the
State as sovereign, or by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."6
The plurality made it clear that a local government would not
be required to point to a "specific detailed legislative authorization"
in order to receive state action immunity.63 The requisite "state ac-
tion" would be demonstrated if the "legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of."'  While the plurality made clear
discuss this apparent contradiction but stated, in a conclusory fashion, that "the State
Action required under Parker has different attributes." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 n.43.
Thus, the Court decided to give local governments the same responsibilities as the states
without giving them the benefits.
The dissent, written by Justice Stewart, argued that the Parker doctrine applied to
any valid government action, not just state government action. Id. at 426. According to
Justice Stewart, Parker made a distinction between private action and government action,
not between the state and other government units. Id. at 429. Thus, Justice Stewart
would have found that local governments were immune from antitrust liability.
59. Id. at 394-408 (Part I of opinion of Brennan, J.). ChiefJustice Burger concurred
in part and in the result. He disagreed with the plurality that the state need only "con-
template" the anticompetitive activities undertaken by the municipality. The ChiefJus-
tice would require the state to compel the anticompetitive conduct of the municipalities.
The Chief Justice also argued that municipalities should be treated the same as private
parties where the antitrust claim concerns a proprietary enterprise. Id. at 422-24. It
should be noted that recently, in the context of determining state immunity to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause, the Court discarded the "traditional govern-
ment function/proprietary function" test because it was not only unworkable but incon-
sistent with principles of federalism. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority,
105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985). Chief Justice Burger dissented in Garcia. 105 S. Ct. at
1021. He joined the judgment of the Court in Lafayette "because [it represented] at a
minimum" what should be demanded of the municipal defendants. 435 U.S. at 425 n.6.
60. 435 U.S. at 415-16.
61. Id. at 412-13.
62. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart, in his dissent, found this aspect of
the plurality decision "senseless." Id. at 431-32. He argued that there was no need "to
require a showing of state compulsion when the State itself acts through one of its gov-
ernmental subdivisions." Id. at 432.
63. Id. at 415.
64. Id. (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434
(5th Cir. 1976)).
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what was not required for state action protection, it failed to provide
guidance as to the type of state expression which would satisfy the
"contemplated" standard.
Many states believed that by granting, or having already
granted, home rule 65 powers to local governments, these govern-
ments would be protected by state action immunity. 66 This belief
stemmed from the nature of home rule powers. When a municipal-
ity is granted home rule powers it has the right to enact legislation
in specifically enumerated areas, while the state gives up its right to
govern only in those enumerated areas. However, this belief of mu-
nicipal immunity resulting from home rule powers was proven in-
correct when the Supreme Court in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder 62 held that granting home rule powers was not
enough to give a local government state action immunity.68
65. Home rule "is the power granted to local units of government to frame, adopt,
and amend charters for their government and to exercise powers of local self-govern-
ment, subject to the constitution and general laws of the state." C. ADRIAN, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 127 (2d ed. 1967).
66. The assertion that many states believed that the granting of home rule powers
satisfied the "contemplated" standard is derived from a negative implication. By 1978,
thirty-four states had some form of home rule powers and at least one state, Delaware,
granted its political subdivisions home rule powers after the Lafayette decision. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 802 (1981). 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw § 3.00
(1986). After the Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette, no state took any action to pro-
tect its subdivisions from antitrust liability. One implication of this failure to act is that
the states believed their subdivisions were already protected.
67. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). For articles discussing state and local governments' reaction
to Boulder and the decision's implications, see Boyle, Dr. Boulder Love; or, How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Local Antitrust Liability, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 635 (1984); Cirace,
An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481
(1982); Civiletti, The Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospects
for a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379 (1983); Fallon, Municipal Government Ex-
emption from Federal Antitrust Laws: An Examination of the Midcal Test After Boulder, 40 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 143 (1983); Lerner, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Forcing
a Reorganization of the State Municipality Relationship Through the Antitrust Laws, 60 U. DET. J.
URB. L. 241 (1983); Page, After Boulder: Some Practical Advice for Avoiding Antitrust Liability,
9 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 264 (1983); Sentell, The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule
Wrecker, 34 MERCER L. REV. 363 (1982); Note, Antitrust: The Parker Doctrine and Home Rule
Municipalities, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 534 (1983); Note, Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder: The Emasculation of Municipal Immunity from Sherman Act Liability, 32 CATH. U.L.
REV. 413 (1983); Note, Home Rule and the Sherman Act After Boulder: Cities Between a Rock
and a Hard Place, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 259 (1983).
68. This result should not have come as a complete surprise. The Boulder decision
was foreshadowed in Justice Stewart's dissent in Lafayette. One of Justice Stewart's ob-
jections to the plurality opinion was that the plurality failed to make clear if a local gov-
ernment's action would be immune from antitrust liability if the state merely
"authorized" the local government's activities. Thus, according to Justice Stewart, "a
municipality that is merely 'authorized'. . . to provide a monopoly service... cannot be
certain it will not be subject to antitrust liability .... " 435 U.S. at 435.
1054 [VOL. 45:1045
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In 1964, the Boulder City Council enacted an ordinance grant-
ing Colorado Televents, Inc., a twenty-year revocable nonexclusive
permit to conduct a cable television business within the city limits.
69
This permit was assigned to the Community Communications Com-
pany (CCC) in 1966.70 In May, 1979, CCC informed Boulder that it
planned to expand its business into other areas of the city. In July,
Boulder Communications Company informed Boulder of its interest
in obtaining a permit to provide competing cable television services
throughout the city. The city council responded by announcing a
three-month moratorium that prohibited CCC from expanding its
business into other areas of the city while the council drafted a
model cable television ordinance. The council claimed that CCC's
continued expansion during the drafting of the ordinance would
discourage potential competitors from entering the market.71
CCC filed suit against Boulder, seeking a preliminary injunction
to prevent the moratorium from taking effect. It alleged that the
moratorium was in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Boul-
der responded that its moratorium was protected from antitrust
claims by the state action doctrine.72
The district court found that the regulation of cable television
was beyond Boulder's home rule powers and, further, that the state
action doctrine was "wholly inapplicable" to Boulder.73 On appeal,
a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed.7 ' The Supreme
Court, in a five-to-three decision, reversed the appellate court and
agreed with the district court.75
According to the Court, a city may not invoke the state action
69. 455 U.S. at 44.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 45-46. This claim was based upon advice the Council received from a hired
consultant. The consultant warned that there was a tendency for a cable system to be-
come a natural monopoly. The Council was concerned about the unfair advantage CCC
might have because it was already operating in Boulder. Id. at 45-46 n.6.
72. Id. at 46-47.
73. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1038-39
(D. Colo. 1980).
74. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 707 (10th
Cir. 1980).
75. 455 U.S. 40. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent, in which ChiefJustice Burger
and Justice O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority incorrectly
concluded that standards of federalism are not implicated when the Sherman Act is ap-
plied to invalidate a municipal ordinance. Id. at 69. He contended that a municipal
ordinance should be upheld when it satisfies the Midcal test, requiring that the ordinance
be enacted pursuant to an affirmative policy on the part of the city to restrain trade and
that the city actively supervises and implements the policy. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis
added).
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doctrine merely because the state specifically granted that city the
right to regulate with respect to the challenged subject matter.76
Rather, the state must have specifically authorized the very action or
conduct that is challenged as anticompetitive. 77 "A state that allows
municipalities to do as they please," observed the Court, "can
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive
actions for which municipal liability is sought."7 " Thus, the Court
rejected the contention that home rule statutes granted municipali-
ties sovereign powers and held that a municipality, even though act-
ing pursuant to its lawful authority, does not enjoy the blanket
antitrust exemption afforded to the states.79
In both Lafayette and Boulder the cities' attempts to place them-
selves within the state action doctrine failed because the cities could
not demonstrate that they were acting in furtherance of a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. While Boulder
resolved the home rule question, it added little to state and local
governments' understanding of what kind of expression of state pol-
icy is required to receive the protection of the state action doctrine.
IV. MARYLAND'S RESPONSE
Even before the appointment of the Governor's Task Force on
Local Government Antitrust Liability (Task Force), the Maryland
Legislature acted to protect its local governments from the antitrust
liability specifically at issue in Boulder. Because of the obvious po-
tential for adverse impact of the Boulder decision on local govern-
ment's cable television franchises, the General Assembly clarified
the authority of Maryland local governments to supplant competi-
tion by granting one or more franchises for cable television systems
on an exclusive basis, to impose franchise fees, to establish certain
rates charged to subscribers, and to establish rules and regulations
to govern the operation of franchises.8 0 The second step was to ap-
point the Task Force, which was given the "responsibility for identi-
fying those areas of local government operations which would be
most subject to antitrust scrutiny and for recommending legislation
76. Id. at 54-56.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 55.
79. Id. at 55-56. It is important to note, as Justice Stevens did in his concurring
opinion, that the Court did not reach the merits of CCC's claim. Id. at 58. The majority
did not decide that Boulder's ordinance violated the Sherman Act; it only decided a
home rule municipality is not exempt from antitrust liability merely by its status as such.
80. 1982 Md. Laws 562.
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to preserve, as much as practicable, the 'state action' defense in
those areas where it was most needed and appropriate."' l In order
to gather information on the local government antitrust problem,
the Task Force held or scheduled eight meetings, including a public
hearing, and seven work sessions open to the public.8 2 The Task
Force consulted with and received testimony and written submis-
sions from numerous people, including city and county officials as
well as attorneys in private practice.8 3 Areas of local government
activity found to be the subject of potential antitrust liability in-
cluded land-use planning and zoning,8 4 municipally owned and
managed businesses, 5 licensing, franchising and regulating busi-
86 87nesses, environmental management and resource recovery, pro-
81. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST LIABILITY, REPORT
at 1 (1983) (hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT). Membership of the Task Force included
the City Solicitor of Baltimore City, the Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Maryland
Attorney General's Office, the County Attorney of Prince George's County, the City
Attorney of the City of Bowie, the County Attorney of Carroll County, the County Attor-
ney of Kent County, and the City Attorney of the City of Rockville, in addition to lawyers
in private practice with experience in representing both plaintiffs and defendants in anti-
trust litigation. Id.
82. Id. The Task Force received testimony and written submissions from a Balti-
more City Councilman, the Executive Director and Assistant Executive Director of the
Maryland Association of Counties, Counsel for the Maryland Environment Service, the
Department of Natural Resources, the Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority, a
senior staff associate for the Maryland Municipal League, Legislative Counsel for Mont-
gomery County, the Legislative Liaison Officer for Baltimore City, a representative for
the University of Maryland Institute for Government Service, a former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, a Professor of Law at the
University of Maryland, and four lawyers in private practice in Baltimore and Washing-
ton, D.C. Id.
83. Id.
84. Letter from Richard Geltman, General Counsel for the National Governor's As-
sociation, to members of Legal Affairs Committee (Feb. 28, 1983) at p. 2 [hereinafter
Geltman letter].
Several lower courts had found local governments liable for antitrust violations aris-
ing out of zoning decisions even before Boulder. These cases included Stauffer v. Town
of Grand Lake, Colorado, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980) (no im-
munity for town and planning commission because state legislature did not "intend that
zoning officials would use their legislative authorization to promote their own interests
and economic benefit[s]," id. at p. 76,330); Mason City Center Associates v. City of Ma-
son City, Iowa, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated in light of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 992 (1978),judgment reinstated, 576
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); and Schiessle v. Stephens, 525
F. Supp. 763 (N.D. 11. 1981). See also Brummit, Zoning and Planning and Antitrust, Inst. on
Plan. Zon. & Eminent Domain Proc. 241 (Ann. 1984); Deutsch, Antitrust Challenges to Local
Zoning and Other Land Use Controls, 60 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 63 (Winter 1984); and Com-
ment, An Argument for an Antitrust Attack on Exclusionary Zoning, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1035
(Summer 1984).
85. Geltman letter, supra note 84, at 2.
86. Id. This category includes business and occupational licensing as well as regula-
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curing and contracting by local governments, 88 and health care
services.89
The Task Force made several recommendations to the General
Assembly. First, the Task Force determined that no changes in the
present cable television law were necessary. Given the explicit na-
ture of the recently enacted cable television law,90 it would have
been difficult for the General Assembly to enact a more clearly ar-
ticulated or affirmatively expressed state policy. The Task Force did
recommend changes in other areas. These recommendations in-
cluded: an omnibus bill amending the various Express Powers Acts
and the Baltimore City Charter to authorize counties and municipal-
ities to supplant competition with respect to a number of specifically
identified areas of governmental activity;9 ' a bill amending statutory
authorization for liquor boards and authorities, housing authorities,
industrial development authorities, and soil conservation districts to
similar effect;9 2 an act amending the various zoning enabling stat-
utes to specify the authority to make anticompetitive decisions in the
zoning process; 93 amendments to the provisions of law creating the
Maryland Environmental Service and the Northeast Maryland Waste
Disposal Authority to specify their authority to regulate and control
trade in the disposal of solid waste;94 and amendments to the provi-
sions of the law governing the State Law Department to authorize
the Office of the Attorney General to defend, as well as prosecute,
antitrust actions on the behalf of municipalities. 95
tion of commercial businesses, taxicabs, airports and cable television. For lower court
cases finding local governments liable in this area, see Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort
Air Services, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C. 1979); and Guthrie v. Genesse County,
N.Y., 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
87. Geltman letter, supra note 84, at 2.
88. Id. This category includes public works construction and operations, competi-
tive and sole-source procurement, and contracting for the operation of civic centers,
sports stadiums and parks.
89. Id.
90. 1982 Md. Laws 562.
91. TASK FORCE REPORT at 5-6. These areas of activity included the sale and lease of
property, the grant of concessions on publicly owned land, and the licensing and opera-
tion of transportation facilities, towing facilities, utilities and health and waste disposal
activities. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 6. The response of the Colorado Legislature was exactly the opposite.
Geltman letter, supra note 84, at 3. On Sept. 9, 1982, following a number of hearings,
the Colorado Legislative Committee unanimously recommended against adopting legis-
lation to immunize local governments. The Committee found that broad based legisla-
tion could not meet the requirements of the case law and would therefore be ineffectual.
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Overall, these recommendations were designed to correct am-
biguities in state law regarding when it would be permissible for lo-
cal government conduct to have anticompetitive effects. Explicit
grants of authority were necessary to meet the first prong of the
Midcal test: the requirement that the local government conduct stem
from a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy
that the local government displace or limit competition in its areas
of regulation.96
Based on these recommendations, a group of four bills was sub-
mitted to the General Assembly. These included Senate Bill 629, 9'
which contained the Task Force recommendation regarding amend-
ing the various zoning enabling statutes; Senate Bill 635,98 which
consisted of the Task Force's second recommendation to amend the
The Committee also believed that such a broad based immunity would act to protect
abuses by public officials. Because of the questions left unanswered by the Supreme
Court, such as the required supervision, the Committee held that legislation at this time
would be precipitous. Id. As of November, 1984, the legislatures of Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and Washington have followed Mary-
land's lead and enacted legislation designed to immunize their local governments from
antitrust immunity. See, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-65-1, 36-65-2 (Cum. Supp. 1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 34 401, ch. 85 2625.1 & 2901 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); LA. CIVIL
CODE ANN. art. 33 § 4792 (Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-01-22 (1983 Repl. Vol.);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-54-103(d) (1986 Repl. Vol.) (with respect to energy production
facilities); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-23.1 and 15.1-28.01 (Supp. 1986); and WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 81.72.200 (Cum. Supp. 1986). Note: The immunity legislation of Tennes-
see, Virginia and Washington is interspersed throughout the Code sections governing
county and municipal powers in much the same manner as the Maryland legislation.
Thus, the statutes cited merely point out representative examples of these states'
legislation.
96. 445 U.S. 97.
97. Enacted at 1983 Md. Laws 395. This act does not create new powers for local
governments but expressly states that the local governments may displace or limit com-
petition through their zoning powers when the purpose of such zoning is to assure the
good government of the localities, to protect and preserve the localities' rights, property
and privileges, to preserve peace and good order, to secure persons and property from
danger and destruction, and to protect the health, comfort and convenience of the citi-
zens of the locality.
98. Enacted at 1983 Md. Laws 510. This act allows government agencies that regu-
late the alcoholic beverages industry, industrial development authorities, housing au-
thorities, and soil conservation districts to exercise their powers in such a manner as to
displace or limit competition. Again, the Act grants no new powers; it merely states
expressly a power which prior to the passage of this Act was implicit. According to the
Act, the purpose of any regulation promulgated regarding the alcoholic beverages in-
dustry must be to obtain respect and obedience to law, to foster and promote temper-
ance, to prevent deceptive, destructive and unethical business practices, and to promote
the general welfare of the citizens of Maryland. The purpose of any housing authority
regulation must be to provide safe, sanitary and decent housing for the citizens of Mary-
land. Any regulation that does not meet one of the purposes stated in the Act is beyond
the scope of the Act.
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statutory authorization of liquor boards, etc.; Senate Bill 645, 99
which empowered the Attorney General to defend local govern-
ments in antitrust suits; and Senate Bill 770,'00 which was the omni-
bus bill recommended by the Task Force to amend the various
Express Powers Acts and the Baltimore City Charter.' °
V. SENATE BILL 770
The debate in the Maryland Legislature surrounding the Task
Force recommendations focused on Senate Bill 770. The following
discussion mirrors that narrowed focus. However, although Senate
Bill 770 will be the only bill expressly mentioned, the problems and
effects discussed are equally applicable to the other bills.
Senate Bill 770 was designed to eliminate the possibility of anti-
trust liability that might otherwise occur as a result of local govern-
ment activities. 10 2 It reaffirmed the Maryland public policy that
local governments are authorized to regulate or engage in activities
that may limit or displace free economic competition.0 3
Several questions about Senate Bill 770 were raised at the hear-
ings conducted prior to its passage. One concern was that the law
could be interpreted to grant new powers to local governments. In
order to prevent such an interpretation the bill was reworded. The
parts of the bill that referred to the power of local governments to
''supplant or limit free business enterprise" were replaced with the
words "displace or limit economic competition. "'104 This new lan-
guage comes directly from the Midcal case and is narrower than the
original wording.
A second concern raised at the hearing was that such a broad-
based statute would also immunize illegal conduct.'0 5 However,
Senate Bill 770 immunizes only conduct that is already authorized
by statute or the state constitution. Improper conduct, such as the
acceptance of bribes, is not authorized conduct; when such conduct
99. Enacted at 1983 Md. Laws 396. Before this Act was passed the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office could only prosecute antitrust cases for local governments; it could not
defend them in the event of such a suit.
100. Enacted at 1983 Md. Laws 397.
101. See supra note 91.
102. SENATE CONsTrruTIONAL & PUBLIc LAw COMM., COMM. REP. SYSTEM PART III:
SUMMARY OF THE COMM. REP., at 1 (1983) (hereinafter COMMIT'EE REPORT).
103. Id.
104. COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 2.
105. See supra note 91. The Colorado Legislature had refused to enact any antitrust
legislation designed to give local governments immunity from liability based on similar
concerns. See Geltman letter, supra note 84, at 3.
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results in an antitrust violation, it has been and remains punishable
through criminal and civil enforcement procedures of the antitrust
laws.10 6 Maryland precedent already recognizes that zoning actions
having no purpose but the prevention of competition are subject to
challenge on that basis.'0 7 This same logic would apply to other
improper conduct allegedly protected by the new bill.
The courts are free to examine how the local governments exer-
cise their authority, and the inquiry does not necessarily stop with a
determination that the local government has the general authority
required. Courts have the expertise to determine when a zoning
board has exceeded the scope of its authority and zoned an area, or
failed to zone an area, because of an impermissible motive or con-
sideration. Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake,'0o a Colorado district court
case, exemplifies how courts make this type of inquiry. In Stauffer, a
landowner alleged that town officials had manipulated the zoning
process to prevent him from developing his property, so as to en-
hance the commercial value of their own property. As an initial mat-
ter, the court found that Colorado's general zoning legislation,
pursuant to which the defendants had acted, "clearly show[ed] a
state policy that some competition [would] be displaced with regula-
tion."' 0 9 The court then held that while Colorado's general zoning
legislation did confer state action immunity in appropriate circum-
stances, the alleged conduct in this case was not within the contem-
plated scope of the town's zoning authority. "The Colorado
Legislature," asserted the court, "did not foresee, contemplate or
intend that zoning officials would use their legislative authorization
to promote their own interests and economic benefit."" 0 Accord-
ingly, immunity was disallowed.
Thus, general authorization statutes do not grant blanket im-
106. Letter from Charles 0. Monk, II, Assistant Attorney General and Chief of the
Antitrust Division, to Honorable Helen L. Ross, Chairman of the Constitutional and
Administrative Law Committee (April 6, 1983) at p. 3.
107. See Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 528-29, 312 A.2d 758,
766 (1973) ("' the prevention of competition is not a proper element of zoning' ") (quot-
ing Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 219, 167 A.2d 345, 351 (1961)); Aspen Hill
Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 314, 289 A.2d 303, 308 (1972)
("where the lack of need is unaccompanied by any detriment to the public interest...
we cannot view [the denial of rezoning] as amounting to anything more than [the Coun-
cil's] substituting an economic judgment of its own for that of [the petitioner], as to the
financial success of the venture.").
108. 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,029 (D. Colo. 1980).
109. Id. at pp. 76,329-76,330. Thus, as a general matter, the zoning board was not
subject to antitrust liability for its zoning decisions even when those decisions had an
anticompetitive effect.
110. Id. at p. 76,330.
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munity to improper conduct. The first step in a court's inquiry is
whether the state authorized the local government to displace com-
petition."' Depending upon the facts alleged, the court can then
inquire into whether this authorization was exercised in the fashion
intended by the legislature.
The major opposition to Senate Bill 770 came from those in the
business of waste disposal." 2 Their concern seemed to be that this
legislation would lead to the taking over of waste disposal by local
governments, thus leaving the waste disposal companies without a
market." 3 This fear seems unfounded. Before the Supreme Court
decisions in Lafayette and Boulder, local governments believed that
they had the authority to displace competition, yet they still em-
ployed private waste disposal companies. There does not seem to
be any reason to believe that, just because the authority has now
been codified, local governments will radically change their
behavior.
A criticism of the Task Force report, raised by some General
Assembly members, was the Task Force's failure to make any recom-
mendations concerning the "active supervision" requirement first
announced by the Supreme Court in Midcal. The Task Force con-
cluded that the Supreme Court would continue to interpret laws
with anticompetitive effects as requiring active state supervision
only when private conduct is involved, and it did not recommend
that such a requirement be included in the proposed statutes.' "4
The Task Force indicated that requiring such state supervision
would be "so intrusive as to nullify many of the benefits of local
home rule and would overburden any agency in which such author-
ity is vested.""' 5 This conclusion proved correct two years later in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire," 6 when the Supreme Court held
that active state supervision is not required for a finding of local
government antitrust immunity." 7 In Hallie, several towns sur-
rounding the respondent city brought suit alleging antitrust viola-
111. Id.
112. See Constitutional & Public Law Comm. File for S. 770, which contains the letters
from different waste disposal companies that operate in the state.
113. Id.
114. TASK FORCE REPORT at 21.
115. Id. The Task Force found that active supervision would not be applied to munic-
ipal conduct because this conduct, unlike private conduct, is already subject to political
restraints.
116. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
117. Id. at 1720. The Court justified distinguishing a municipality from a private
party by establishing a presumption that private parties act in their own behalf, whereas
municipalities, as creatures of the states, act in the interest of the public. Id. at 1720-21.
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tions based upon the city's refusal to supply sewage treatment
services to the towns."' While the city refused these services to the
towns, it did supply such services to individual landowners who al-
lowed their property to be annexed and who also used the city's
sewage collection and transportation services." 9 The Court found
that the city was acting pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state pol-
icy to displace competition because the statute empowering the city
to provide sewage services also empowered the city to refuse to fur-
nish those services to unannexed areas.' 2' The Court then went on
to hold that the active state supervision requirement should not be
imposed in cases in which the actor is a municipality. 12 1 According
to the Court, there is no need for a state to actively supervise the
local government's exercise of a properly delegated function. 122
Thus, in order to receive antitrust immunity under the state action
doctrine, a local government need demonstrate only that it is acting
pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Senate Bill 770 was
designed to articulate Maryland policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 770 expressly grants authority to local governments
to displace competition in certain areas in order to protect those
governments from antitrust liability resulting from the performance
of their normal duties. Some commentators believe that this type of
legislation is unnecessary now because of Congress' enactment of
the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (the Act) which pre-
vents plaintiffs from recovering damages from local governments. 23
While this legislation removes the immediate threat of treble dam-
ages, the belief that this legislation corrects the problems associated
with subjecting local governments to antitrust liability ignores the
burdensome nature of antitrust litigation. The Act leaves intact the
threat of suits seeking injunctions, 24 and the potential invalidation
of local government laws. Even before the passage of the Act, a
significant number of antitrust claimants against local governments
118. Id. at 1715-16.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1718-19.
121. Id. at 1720.
122. Id. at 1721.
123. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1984). The Act
bars claimants seeking treble damages, except those who filed before Sept. 24, 1984,
from obtaining any monetary relief from local governments if the defendant(s) acted in
an official capacity.
124. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) allows for injunctive relief.
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sought only equitable relief. Antitrust litigation is enormously ex-
pensive and has increasingly become the province of a specialized
bar that commands high fees.' 25 Under the rule of Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,' 26 summary procedures are to be used sparingly
in antitrust litigation.' 27 For this reason, antitrust litigation charac-
teristically is not resolvable on a motion to dismiss, but only after
prolonged discovery proceedings.1 28
Even when defendants succeed in ultimately securing dismissal
of an antitrust case or a victory at trial, their attorney's fees and
other expenses are not reimbursable. 129 Consequently, the ex-
tended prosecution of an antitrust action will frequently be a catas-
trophe for a local government.' 30 This problem was demonstrated
in Maryland prior to enactment of Senate Bill 770. In 1982, the
Attorney General of Maryland, pursuant to Chapter 139 of the Acts
of 1982, to defend Soil Conservation Districts in antitrust cases, re-
quested a special allocation of $40,000 from the Board of Public
Works to defend a single antitrust suit against five districts, the
Maryland Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of Agricul-
ture.' 3 ' Another example occurred in 1982, when a Maryland mu-
nicipality, Sharpsburg, was sued in a antitrust case based on a
zoning decision concerning the selling of tires in a certain section of
the municipality. The ensuing litigation cost Sharpsburg $12,000 in
a one-year period.' 3 2 At the time, the town had a yearly budget of$18,151. l s
It is not just the litigation itself which is a financial drain on
local governments. Litigation often adversely affects municipal
bond ratings. 1' Also, the project which is the subject of a suit may
be halted pending disposition of that suit. These delays will often
contribute to increased project costs. 13 While federal legislation
protects local governments from the most publicized aspect of anti-
trust suits, i.e. treble damage awards, it by no means protects local
governments from all the ills associated with antitrust litigation.
125. TASK FORCE REPORT at 9-10.
126. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
127. Id. at 473.
128. TASK FORCE REPORT at 9-10.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 10 n.4.
132. Letter from the Maryland Municipal League to the Constitutional and Adminis-
trative Law Committee in support of Senate Bill 770 (April 5, 1983) at p.3.
133. The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 22, 1983, at 6A, col. 3.
134. Geltman letter, supra note 84, at 2.
135. Id.
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Despite the recent federal legislation, in order to protect local
government from antitrust suits states still need to provide a clear
articulation of their policy concerning the displacement of competi-
tion. Maryland is at the vanguard of this type of legislation. It was
the first state to enact a statute specifically designed to protect local
governments from antitrust liablity. The statute affords local gov-
ernments the greatest protection possible by going one step beyond
what the Supreme Court has stated is required in order for local
governments to receive "state action" protection. By providing
"specific detailed legislative authorization" ' 6 Maryland protects its
local governments from the uncertainty of a court determination on
whether the statute under which they are acting is a clear articula-
tion of a state policy to displace competition. Given the historical
confusion surrounding what exactly constitutes a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy, a statute such as that en-
acted by Maryland is the only sure method of providing antitrust
immunity to local governments.
SUSAN M. STEVENS
136. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
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